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Abstract 
 
The Role of Rhetoric in Legitimizing Authority:  
The Speeches of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah During the 2006 War 
 
Rebecca Ann Gutow Hopkins, MA; MPAff 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisors:  Mahmoud al-Batal and Jeremi Suri 
 
In 2006, Hizbullah operatives captured two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border 
attack, prompting a 34-day war in which neither Israel nor Hizbullah emerged victorious. 
Yet despite Hizbullah’s instigation of the war, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-
General of Hizbullah, largely retained both his popular appeal and his legitimacy during 
and after the conflict.  
Noting this paradox, I examine how Nasrallah maintained his legitimacy, defined 
as having an accepted claim to authority, throughout and after the war. To do so, I 
perform content analysis on the seven major speeches that Nasrallah delivered during the 
war in order to answer the following question: How did Nasrallah utilize rhetoric to 
maintain his legitimacy as Hizbullah’s leader throughout the 2006 war between Israel and 
Hizbullah? I then draw upon these observations to discuss my subsidiary research 
question: How does having a better understanding of political rhetoric, particularly in 
terms of Hizbullah, affect U.S. policies towards the Middle East, and specifically in 
Lebanon?  
 vi 
I argue that Nasrallah framed his message in these speeches using three particular 
themes: the “us versus them” narrative; the fulfillment of a divinely inspired mission, also 
known as the NasR ilaahi, or the divine triumph theme; and Hizbullah’s role as the 
protector of the Lebanese and the Palestinians. In tandem with Hizbullah’s self-
identification as a resistance movement, I show that Nasrallah continuously qualified 
Hizbullah’s mission as defensive. I also demonstrate that Nasrallah chose his words to 
foster a sense of community and common purpose. Additionally, I note that he often 
appealed to values widely held through the Arab world, including the sense of karaama, 
or dignity, and taDaamun, or solidarity, in his remarks.  
To answer the second question, I review current U.S. policies towards Lebanon 
and note the ways in which these policies may not resonate with the Lebanese population. 
I argue that current U.S. policies, which focus on supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, 
the Internal Security Forces, developing stronger civil society, and promoting 
democratization, do not counter Hizbullah’s power partly because U.S. public diplomacy 
initiatives do not take Nasrallah’s rhetoric and legitimacy into account.   
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 1 
Chapter 1: What is Legitimacy? 
INTRODUCTION  
Legitimacy, which is defined as having an accepted claim to authority, is an 
integral component of an entity’s ability to assert power over a particular group or set of 
groups. But how does one establish and maintain legitimacy? The answer to this question 
is multi-faceted. 
Individuals have long realized the power of great orators. One need only 
remember the legacies of Demosthenes, Cicero, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, and Martin Luther King, Jr. to recognize the role that rhetoric may play in 
influencing a constituency and legitimizing authority, both positively and negatively. 
Recent scholarship supports this common view that rhetoric generates and supports 
legitimacy. Political scientist Bruce Gilley notes that “[l]egitimacy appears to be 
generated through reasonable and rational processes of communication and evaluation.”1 
Similarly, Lisa Wedeen, while studying legitimacy and political outcomes in Syria, 
details how communication figures into legitimizing authority. She suggests that:  
 
…[the] ‘ideational’ group or the school of political culture, has suggested that 
rhetoric and symbols determine political outcomes. ‘Discourse’ in the ideational 
school is an independent variable. Such interpretations tend to suggest that 
‘successful’ rhetoric and symbols produce ‘legitimacy,’ ‘charisma,’ or 
‘hegemony’ for the regime, enabling political leaders to win support for 
themselves and their policies by fostering collective ethnic, national, or class 
identifications.2 
From this premise, this paper focuses on the rhetoric of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, 
Secretary-General of Hizbullah,3 during the 2006 war between Hizbullah and Israel. 
                                                
1 Bruce Gilley, "Interview with Bruce Gilley, Author of The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose 
Legitimacy," Columbia University Press, accessed April 25, 2012, 
http://www.cup.columbia.edu/static/bruce-gilley-interview. 
2 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 5. 
3 Hizbullah comes from the two Arabic words that mean “Party of God.” Other common English 
transliterations of the phrase include Hezbollah, Hezballah, Hizballah, and Hizb’allah. 
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Neither Israel nor Hizbullah emerged victorious from this 34-day conflict. Israel engaged 
in a poorly planned but comprehensive air, ground, and naval campaign that devastated 
large parts of Lebanon. Nonetheless, the campaign failed to achieve its stated goals; 
namely, to recover the two kidnapped soldiers and eradicate Hizbullah. Hizbullah, which 
purported to initiate the conflict in order to liberate Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails, 
and demonstrate support for the Palestinians following the Israeli raids in Gaza the 
preceding month, largely failed as well. Both sides experienced tremendous human and 
material costs. More than 1,100 Lebanese, 119 Israeli soldiers, and 40 Israeli civilians 
were killed as a result of the conflict.4 Approximately 700 Hizbullah operatives died.5 
Nearly 4,400 Israelis and Lebanese were injured.6 The economic toll in Lebanon topped 
$15 billion.7 Israel incurred nearly $6 billion in damages.8 
After the war, approval ratings for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert dropped to 
3%. The 2008 Winograd Report, which assessed the mistakes made by Israeli leadership 
in the war, excoriated both Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak for their poor 
decision-making and tactical choices throughout the conflict.9 Sixty-three percent of 
Israelis called for Olmert’s resignation; polls indicated that 74% of Israelis wanted Barak 
to resign.10 In contrast, Nasrallah largely escaped public condemnation and maintained 
his legitimacy, despite admitting that Hizbullah had made a grave tactical error by 
                                                
4 Human Rights Watch, Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon During the 2006 War (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, September 2007), 4. 
5 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and 
Getting it Right in Gaza (Santa Monica: Rand, 2011), xix. 
6 Human Rights Watch, 4. 
7 John K. Cooley, "Rebuilding Lebanon Is a Moral Imperative - And a Wise Strategy," The Christian 
Science Monitor, September 5, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0905/p09s01-coop.html. 
8 “The War in Figures,” Yadi’ot Ahronot, August 15, 2006 in Joseph Alagha, "The Israeli-Hizbullah 34-
Day War: Causes and Consequences," Arab Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 3. 
9 For a summary of the Commission’s report (in English), see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/30/world/middleeast/31winograd-web.html?pagewanted=all 
For the full report (in Hebrew), see: http://www.vaadatwino.co.il/pdf/חוד%20יפוס.pdf. 
10 "Israelis Call on Olmert to Resign," Trumpet.com, August 30, 2006, 
http://www.thetrumpet.com/?q=2786.1321.0.0&preview. 
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committing the abductions and provoking the attack on the Israelis. 11  Similarly, 
Hizbullah suffered no major damage to its popularity as a result of the war. During the 
2009 elections, Hizbullah performed better than it ever had previously.12 
Noting this paradox, this paper examines the seven major speeches that Nasrallah 
delivered the 2006 war in order to understand better how Nasrallah employed rhetoric 
throughout the crisis. Through these speeches, I attempt to answer the following question: 
How did Hassan Nasrallah utilize rhetoric to maintain his legitimacy as Hizbullah’s 
leader throughout the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah? I then draw upon these 
observations to discuss my subsidiary research question: How does having a better 
understanding of political rhetoric, particularly in terms of Hizbullah, affect U.S. policies 
towards the Middle East, and specifically in Lebanon? 
METHODOLOGY & FINDINGS 
In order to examine how Nasrallah employed rhetoric to legitimize his authority, I 
performed content analysis on the seven speeches that he delivered during the 2006 war. 
Each of these speeches was broadcast on Hizbullah’s channel, al-Manar. I argue that 
Nasrallah framed his message in these speeches using three particular themes: the “us 
versus them” narrative; the fulfillment of a divinely inspired mission, also known as the 
NasR ilaahi, or the divine triumph theme;13 and Hizbullah’s role as the protector of the 
Lebanese and the Palestinians. 
                                                
11 In an interview giving on al-Manar on August 26, 2006, Nasrallah stated that Hizbullah leadership 
expected that Israel’s response would be limited. According to Nasrallah, “We did not think that the 
capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me if I had known on July 11…that 
an operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.” For more information, see: 
"Nasrallah: We Wouldn't Have Snatched Soldiers if We Thought it Would Spark War," Haaretz, August 
27, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/news/nasrallah-we-wouldn-t-have-snatched-soldiers-if-we-thought-it-
would-spark-war-1.199556. 
12 In 2009, Hizbullah won ten seats and two cabinet posts. It is also part of the ruling March 8 coalition, 
which controls 18 of the 30 total cabinet posts. When Hizbullah first participated in elections in 1992, it 
won eight seats and refused to accept any cabinet posts. 
13 The literal translation of this phrase is “the victory of God.” 
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I also demonstrate that Nasrallah chose the words that he used for these addresses 
to foster a sense of community and common purpose. For example, despite Hizbullah’s 
Shi’ite origins and Lebanon’s divided society, Nasrallah generally avoided using either 
religious or ethnic sectarian terminology. Instead, his remarks were largely inclusive and 
appealed to a wide swath of supporters; he structured his religious comments to appeal to 
both the Muslim and the Christian communities. Additionally, he often appealed to 
values widely held through the Arab world, including the sense of karaama, or dignity, 
and taDaamun, or solidarity, in his remarks. 
In tandem with Hizbullah’s self-identification as a resistance movement, 
Nasrallah continuously qualified Hizbullah’s mission as defensive. 14  By doing so, 
Nasrallah had the ability to accomplish two goals: to justify Hizbullah’s continued 
defense alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces and to refuse to disarm per Security 
Council Resolution 1701,15 which ended the war. He also tended to use language largely 
reserved for the nation-state, particularly when he spoke about protecting the nation and 
providing for the Lebanese after the war.  
To answer the second question, I review current U.S. policies towards Lebanon 
and note the ways in which these policies may not resonate with the Lebanese population. 
I observe that current U.S. policies, which focus on supporting the Lebanese Armed 
Forces, the Internal Security Forces, developing stronger civil society, and promoting 
democratization, do not counter Hizbullah’s power partly because U.S. public diplomacy 
initiatives do not take Nasrallah’s rhetoric and legitimacy into account.   
I do not propose that Nasrallah’s compelling use of rhetoric fully explains his 
appeal. To do so would ignore other salient variables, notably Hizbullah’s extensive 
network of social services and instances in which the group has employed violence and 
                                                
14 Hizbullah often refers to itself as al-moqawama al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic resistance. 
15 For the full text of Security Council Resolution 1701, see: 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm 
 
 
 5 
coercion in order to achieve its goals. Yet Nasrallah’s fame throughout the Middle East 
as a compelling orator belies the importance of rhetoric and the value that he places on it 
himself. His popularity and celebrity extend far beyond Hizbullah’s Shi’ite base. Instead, 
Nasrallah draws on four main constituencies and targets each in his statements: Lebanese 
Shi’ites; the general Lebanese population; the Palestinians; and the greater Arab 
population. Most importantly, he is the public face of Hizbullah. What he says, and how 
he says it, matter.  
THE ROLE OF RHETORIC IN ARAB CULTURE 
Historically, rhetoric and oratory have figured prominently into Arab culture. The 
earliest Arabic literary traditions, known as jahiliyya poetry, are based on an oral 
tradition. Similarly, the Qur’an was originally meant to be transmitted orally; the term 
qur’an itself means recitation. Although scribes of the Prophet Mohammad eventually 
wrote down the verses that he revealed, the practice of Qur’anic recitation continues 
throughout the Muslim world. Presently, there are ten different versions of Qur’anic 
recitation. Those with the ability to recite are widely respected. 
Throughout Nasrallah’s tenure as Hizbullah’s secretary-general, he has 
demonstrated a deep understanding of the relationship between rhetoric and legitimacy. 
Despite having a slight speech impediment, Nasrallah has developed a reputation for 
being a skilled and commanding orator. He is considered one of the greatest speakers of 
his generation of Arab leaders, with a voice unheard since the passing of Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser. He delivers most of his long addresses in Modern 
Standard Arabic (MSA), although he will occasionally use words and phrases from the 
Levantine dialect.16 By primarily speaking in MSA, Nasrallah is able to demonstrate his 
command of the language. Speaking for long stretches in MSA requires significant 
                                                
16 Arabic is considered a diglossic language because it exists in two forms: the standardized form (Modern 
Standard Arabic) and the vernacular form (Arabic dialects).  Modern Standard Arabic is primarily used for 
literature, spoken media, and written media, while the dialects are generally used in day-to-day functions 
(although mixing of the two forms is common, particularly among educated speakers). 
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education and training; those who have the capabilities to do so are widely respected. 
Thus, Nasrallah’s ability to deliver a speech in MSA commands respect and contributes 
to his authority. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 
The present section concludes with a brief review of the literature on legitimacy. 
The second chapter provides a short history of Lebanese politics, the origins and growth 
of Hizbullah, the group’s organizational structure, and its social welfare and media 
outreach initiatives. The second chapter also includes a brief biography of Nasrallah. 
The third chapter begins with a synopsis of the 2006 war between Israel and 
Hizbullah. I then proceed to analyze the seven speeches Nasrallah gave during the war, 
noting the shared trends and communication styles. This analysis focuses on the three 
frames within which Nasrallah focused his narrative (the “us versus them” narrative, the 
divinely inspired mission, and the true protector of the Lebanese and Palestinians). I also 
demonstrate that Nasrallah employs language traditionally reserved for the nation-state to 
inflate Hizbullah’s role and analyze the specificity with which Nasrallah chooses his 
words.  
In the fourth chapter, I discuss how having a better understanding of political 
rhetoric, particularly in terms of Hizbullah, affects U.S. policies towards the Middle East, 
and specifically in Lebanon. To do so, I comment on Hizbullah’s present role in regional 
politics, particularly as it relates to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. I review the 
current challenges that Hizbullah is facing, particularly following the unrest of the Arab 
Spring. I then detail the ways in which understanding Nasrallah’s communication 
patterns may affect and detract from U.S. policy initiatives in the Middle East. I conclude 
with thoughts on possibilities for Nasrallah’s future leadership. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
At its most basic, legitimacy can be defined as having consent to the right to 
govern.17 Legitimate entities possess an accepted claim to authority. However, the 
concept of legitimacy resists exacting, quantifiable analysis. 18  Samuel Huntington 
admitted as much when he referred to legitimacy as a “mushy” concept.19 Yet despite its 
amorphous nature, legitimacy continues to be a telling variable in social science research, 
wherein most researchers agree that belief and opinion play an integral role in its 
definition.20  
Max Weber posits that legitimacy derives from three possible sources: tradition, 
charisma, and legality.21 According to Weber, legitimacy is essential both for security 
and good governance.22 While his argument presumes that the government of a nation-
state is the primary vessel for legitimacy, nothing in his discussion precludes a sub-
national group, supra-national group, or non-state actor, such as Hizbullah, from 
engaging with similar sources to obtain legitimacy.23  
Drawing on Weber, Seymour Martin Lipset suggests that legitimacy is predicated 
on institutions. He notes that legitimacy is “the capacity of the system to engender and 
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for 
                                                
17 Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political 
Responsibility, trans. David Ames Curtis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 10. 
18 Ted Gurr suggests that the following terms are synonymous with legitimacy: “political community;” 
“political myth;” “support;” “authoritativeness;” and “system affect.” Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 183-185 in Michael C. Hudson, "The Legitimacy Problem in 
Arab Politics," in Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 1-
2. 
19 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 46 in Wedeen, 7. 
20 Wedeen, 7. 
21 H.M. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. From Max Weber (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 77-
79 in Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1995), 6. 
22 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott Parsons, trans. A.M. 
Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 124-126; Reinhard Bendix, 
Max Weber (New York: Doublesday, 1960), 294-295 in Michael C. Hudson, "The Legitimacy Problem in 
Arab Politics," in Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 1. 
23 However, it should be noted that Weber claims that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force. 
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the society.” 24  Lipset’s inclusion of institutions is understandable; presumably, 
institutions function at their highest when a society buys into their value. By using this 
definition, the nature of Hizbullah’s relationship with the Lebanese political institutions 
may be symbiotic; Hizbullah both lends legitimacy to and derives legitimacy from a 
system in which it interacts with the institutions.  
Membership itself may be the key to legitimacy. As David Easton notes, “the 
most stable support will derive from the conviction on the part of the member that it is 
right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the 
requirements of the regime.”25 Simply by buying into and supporting a particular 
authority, members are conferring legitimacy upon said authority.    
Rustow’s definition also underscores the significance of membership in 
conferring legitimacy, stating that “the legitimate order requires a distinct sense of 
corporate selfhood: the people within a territory must feel a sense of political community 
which does not conflict with other subnational or supranational communal 
identifications.” While Rustow’s definition is compelling, it does not allow for those who 
subscribe to identities other than that of the nation-state, and thus fails to explain the 
source from which Hizbullah derives its legitimacy. While Hizbullah recognizes its 
Lebanese character, as evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of those fighting for 
Hizbullah are Lebanese,26 its appeal goes far beyond its national identification. The group 
appeals to the Shi’ite community both within and outside of Lebanon, to the Palestinians, 
to many in the wider Lebanese community, and to the broader Arab population. 
                                                
24 Lipset in Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary 
Syria (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 9. 
25 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), 302-302 in Michael C. 
Hudson, "The Legitimacy Problem in Arab Politics," in Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 18. 
26 Mehdi Mozaffari, "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept," in Islamic Political Thought 
and Governance, ed. Abdullah Saeed, vol. IV of Critical Concepts in Political Science (London: 
Routledge, 2011), 294. 
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Other scholars suggest that charisma and personality drive legitimacy, a point 
which I will largely explore throughout this paper. According to David Easton, “A strong 
personal leader may generate legitimacy for a regime or an entire system. The regime or 
opposition movement that succeeds in identifying itself with a highly salient ideological 
problem may win positive support.” The value of this statement lies not only in its 
recognition of how personality may shape legitimacy, but the way in which personality 
and ideology interact to strengthen support.  
In his seminal book, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, Michael Hudson 
explores the meaning of legitimacy within the framework of Arab politics. While it is 
important to note that the book’s publication (1979) occurred at a time a geopolitical 
upheaval and pre-dates Hizbullah’s inception, Hudson presents ideas that remain 
applicable both to current Arab politics and Hizbullah in particular. Hudson suggests that 
within the Arab world two factors in particular determine an entity’s legitimacy: the 
ability to assert influence, which he defines as threat, coercion, promise and reward, and a 
group or government’s recognition of what he refers to as “all-Arab core concerns.” 
Hudson identifies the plight of the Palestinians as foremost among these concerns.  
Similar to Easton, Hudson assigns value to the role of personality in defining 
legitimacy, noting that personality-driven leadership is “a formidable legitimacy resource 
partly because of the absence of countervailing structures and partly because the leaders 
have been able to embody in themselves some of the diffuse legitimizing values arising 
out of political culture.”27 He further observes that, from a historical and cultural vantage 
point, political systems within the Arab world have often been heavily dependent on 
personality-driven leadership; the history of poorly functioning institutions within Arab 
political systems has reinforced the role of personality-driven leadership, as typified by 
Gamal abd al-Nasser. As a caveat, Hudson is careful to note that the dearth of high 
                                                
27 Hudson, 20. 
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functioning institutions, as well as what he calls the “throes of ideological change,” have 
required those in personal leadership roles to “carry more of the legitimacy burden than 
they can easily bear.”28  
Relatedly, Hudson notes the significance of ideology in legitimacy, arguing that, 
“[i]deology bulks large as a legitimate resource in Arab politics.”29 He draws on 
Palestinian thinker Hisham Sharabi to make this point, noting that Arab leaders more 
frequently invoke nationalist symbols in their speeches, including “Islam, Palestine, 
democracy, liberation, and social justice,” in lieu of policy alternatives and discussions.30 
While one may question whether this is a trend specific to Arab politics, his underlying 
assertion remains salient.  
Many of these theories on legitimacy apply to Hizbullah, and Nasrallah in 
particular. Yet the ways in which the group identifies and legitimizes itself also require 
examination. Because of Hizbullah’s foundation as a Shi’ite Islamist group, it is 
necessary to examine legitimacy within the context of Islam.  
Drawing heavily on Khomeinist ideology, Hizbullah bases its leadership and 
philosophy of obedience on the concept of wilaayat al-faqih, or guardianship of the jurist. 
In essence, Hizbullah “subscribes to the doctrine of clerical supremacy.” As a result of 
this allegiance, Hizbullah’s leaders have articulated their loyalty to both Ayatollah 
Khomeini and his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, who, in turn, have the ability to 
venerate both Hizbullah’s leadership and decisions.31 In the case of Nasrallah, Ayatollah 
Khamenei has backed his leadership since 1992 and allowed Nasrallah to extend his term 
as Secretary-General despite the term limits imposed on the position. From this hierarchy, 
one may infer that Nasrallah, and others within Hizbullah, derive legitimacy from 
working within this Shi’ite framework. 
                                                
28 Ibid, 19. 
29 Ibid, 20. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 33. 
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By examining these different frameworks for legitimacy, it is possible to 
understand the ways in which Hizbullah, and Nasrallah in particular, legitimize 
themselves to their various constituencies. Yet Hizbullah’s status within Lebanon 
complicates the question of legitimacy. While the organization recognizes and 
participates in the Lebanese political system, Hizbullah is more influential, better 
financed, and better armed than the Lebanese government. The group has previously 
demonstrated its ability to cow the government into submission.32 Thus, one must also 
ask whether Hizbullah’s legitimacy is largely derived in comparison with other political 
actors within Lebanon and the Arab world. Most notably, Hizbullah has perpetuated the 
perception of having successfully resisting Israel; no other group can lay claim to this. 
Thus, it is possible that Hizbullah’s legitimacy, and particularly Nasrallah’s, is at least 
partially dependent on the failures of many other Arab political entities.  
  
                                                
32 For example, in May 2008, the Siniora government attempted to curtail Hizbullah’s power by disabling 
its communications network in southern Lebanon. The government also attempted to remove the security 
chief of the Beirut airport, Wafik Shkeir, due to his alleged ties with Hizbullah. In response, Hizbullah took 
control of West Beirut through force, with Nasrallah declaring that the government’s decision to shut down 
the communications network was tantamount to an act of war. The government eventually allowed 
Hizbullah to continue to operate its communications network and reinstate Shkeir. 
 
 
 12 
Chapter 2:  Hizbullah: The Party of God 
INTRODUCTION 
Hizbullah’s appeal as both a political and military organization has steadily grown 
since the party’s inception in 1982. Although the Shi’ite group began as the Islamist 
counterweight to the secular Shi’ite party Amal,33 Hizbullah rapidly gained supporters 
among various constituencies, including the Lebanese Shi’ite community, large portions 
of the Lebanese population, the Palestinians, and the general Arab population. The 
perception that Hizbullah forced the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon 
in 2000, widely held throughout the Middle East, caused the group’s popularity to 
skyrocket. 
This section provides a short history of Lebanese politics before delving into a 
discussion of the origins of Hizbullah, its organizational structure, and seminal periods in 
the party’s evolution. It also provides an overview of the main players, with particular 
emphasis on the ascent of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah within the party, before concluding 
with a discussion of how the party espouses and practices leadership.  
THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Home to 18 different religious sects, 34  religious diversity is a hallmark of 
Lebanese society. As a result, sectarian trends figure prominently into the Lebanese 
political structure. The Lebanese political system, which is based around the country’s 
confessional nature, codified and legitimized these divisions. 
In 1943, when Lebanon gained its independence from France, the National Pact, 
or al-mithaaq al-waTani,35 accorded political power and military positions based on 
                                                
33 Amal is the Arabic word for hope. It is an acronym derived from the group’s formal name “Afwaaj al-
Moqawama al-Lubnaniyya”, or the Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance.  
34 Recognized sects include: Sunni, Shi’ite, Druze, ‘Alawi, Assyrian, Copt, Syriac Catholic, Syriac 
Orthodox, Chaldean, Maronite, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, 
Aremenian Catholic, evangelical Christian, an amalgamation of small Christian sects, and Jews. For more 
information, see: Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 11.  
35 The National Pact is an unwritten understanding of the power-sharing dynamics in Lebanon. 
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religious sect. Based largely on a census done in 1932, in which the Maronite and Sunni 
communities comprised the largest segments of society, and the favored status of the 
Maronites under French rule, the pact dictates that only a Maronite may be president to 
the country and only a Sunni may hold the position of prime minister. As the third-largest 
sect in Lebanon, the pact prescribes that the speaker of the house must be a Shi’ite; 
however, this position carries far less political weight and prestige than either the 
presidency or the premiership.  
The makeup of governmental bureaucracy reflected and reinforced this 
underrepresentation. In 1946, Maronites occupied 40% of the highest civil service posts; 
Sunnis occupied an additional 27%. In contrast, Shi’ites only comprised 3.2% of these 
posts.36  
The mithaaq al-waTani remained in effect until 1989, when the Ta’if Accord 
formally ended the Lebanese civil war after 15 years of fighting. While the Ta’if Accord 
maintained the power-sharing bureaucratic structure, it stipulated that parliamentary seats 
be divided equally between Christians and Muslims. According to Lebanese scholar 
Nazih Richani, “[i]n a sense, the Ta’if Accord is merely an updated version of the 1943 
National Pact; it made explicit what had been generally a norm with a slight change 
reflecting the new demographics of the Muslim population.”37 The provisions of the Ta’if 
Accord remain in effect. 
THE LEBANESE SHI’ITE COMMUNITY 
As a result of sectarian trends and dynamics, the Lebanese Shi’ite community has 
traditionally experienced political and economic disenfranchisement within Lebanon. 
Before the 1940s, more than 85% of Shi’ites lived in southern Lebanon and the Biqaa’ 
Valley, both of which were largely underdeveloped and provided few economic 
                                                
36 Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004),12.  
37 Nazih Richani, Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the 
Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949-1996 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 21. 
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opportunities. Most Shi’ites traditionally engaged in agricultural and industrial activities, 
whereas Maronites and Sunnis tended to be active in the commerce, finance, and real 
estate.38 Moreover, Shi’ite vegetable and tobacco farmers were largely unable to support 
themselves. As a result, the Shi’ite community had few opportunities for socioeconomic 
advancement. 
Israel’s creation in 1948 compounded these economic woes. Following the U.N. 
declaration of Israeli statehood, Palestinians flooded many of the surrounding Arab 
countries; Jordan and Lebanon witnessed the largest influxes. The inflow of Palestinians 
placed additional stress on the already tenuous Lebanese economy. Shi’ites in particular 
felt the strain of having to compete for economic opportunities with the Palestinians. 
As a result, many Shi’ites migrated from southern Lebanon and the Biqaa’ Valley 
to Beirut in the 1950s and 1960s, searching for vocational opportunities. Simultaneously, 
the Shi’ite population grew rapidly. Estimates indicate that the Shi’ite population tripled 
between 1956 and 1975, from 250,000 to 750,000. Proportionally, the Shi’ites grew from 
19% of the Lebanese population to 30%.39 However, the confessional political system, 
which had not been designed to adjust for either rapid population growth or for shifting 
demographics, did not account for these changes. Their political disenfranchisement 
continued. 
In the late 1950s, the Shi’ite community found a champion when Imam Musa al-
Sadr. Al-Sadr, an Iranian émigré to Lebanon, noted the subservient position occupied by 
the Shi’ite community. In response, he established and organized Harakat al-
MaHruumiin, or the Movement of the Deprived, in order to mobilize the Shi’ite 
community to push for political and socioeconomic gains. His movement gained traction 
among a large number of Shi’ite clerics, particularly those who attended the famous 
Shi’ite seminary in Najaf, Iraq. Charles Winslow notes that the movement “was not bent 
                                                
38 Hamzeh, 13. 
39 Ibid.  
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on the destruction of the Lebanese Republic but sought both to get more representation 
for the Shi’ite community in the country’s political system and to receive more equitable 
treatment, economically and socially, from the landlords and moneyed elite who, it was 
claimed, kept the poorer Shi’ite classes in their desperate condition.”40  
THE CREATION OF HIZBULLAH 
Amal, a secular Shi’ite political and military movement, evolved out of Harakat 
al-MaHruumiin in 1975. While often overshadowed by the Lebanese civil war, the group 
began attract notice and get political traction. Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance in Libya in 
1978 drew further attention to the group, facilitating its growth. The group quickly 
consolidated its power and became the de facto representative of the Shi’ite population.  
While calls for Shi’ite enfranchisement had grown successively louder since the 
1960s, the 1979 Iranian Revolution provided a rallying point for Shi’ites throughout the 
Middle East, and particularly in Lebanon, who desired to merge their political and 
religious agendas. Deputy Secretary General of Hizbullah, Naim Qassem, recalls that the 
“[t]hirst for an Islamic revolution came in tandem with a rising and insistent need for 
political revitalization in a country like Lebanon, and need that was not fulfilled by 
practical Islamic activity at the time of the Revolution.”41 Amal, though an effective 
representative, largely did not capitalize on the religious aspect of the Shi’ite identity.  
Simultaneously, the constant influx of Palestinians into southern Lebanon, and in 
particular the presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), continued to 
impact negatively the Shi’ite community. The PLO launched attacks against Israel from 
southern Lebanon, thus subjecting the Shi’ite community to the brunt of the retribution. 
Since both were fighting the Palestinians, the Israelis and the Shi’ites were natural allies 
in the late 1970s; some anecdotes indicate that the Shi’ites welcomed the Israelis with 
rosewater. However, when the Israelis invaded Lebanon in 1982 to counter the attacks by 
                                                
40 Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (London: Routledge, 1996), 197. 
41 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, trans. Dalia Khalil (London: Saqi, 2005), 18. 
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PLO, they caught the Shi’ite community in the crossfire. This tactical error irreversibly 
damaged relations between the two and spurred Hizbullah’s creation.  
After the Israeli occupation, a Shi’ite cleric named Abbas Moussawi formed 
Hizbullah by breaking away from Amal with a core group of supporters who desired to 
create a party based on Islamic ideals. Although based on the tenets of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, growing tensions in Amal and the Israeli invasion catalyzed the split. 
Between 1982 and 1992, Hizbullah largely functioned as a paramilitary organization, 
eschewing participation in the Lebanese political system. The group, whose name comes 
from the Qur’anic verse that states, “Verily the party of God shall be victorious,”42 
published its core mission in its 1985 Manifesto. Within the Manifesto, Hizbullah defined 
itself as a resistance movement, called on the Lebanese Maronites to convert to Islam, 
and excoriated the Zionist enemy. Over the years, Hizbullah has amended its initial call 
for conversion, but maintained its identity as a resistance movement and vanguard against 
the Zionists. 
The 1992 elections, following the end of the Lebanese civil war, forced Hizbullah 
to consider if and how it wanted to participate in the Lebanese political system. 
Traditionally, the group had condemned the confessional nature of the Lebanese political 
system. Nasrallah, who became Secretary-General in 1992, decided that the group would 
participate in elections, but not hold any ministerial positions. In the two decades since, 
Hizbullah has increasingly recognized electoral success. The group has also reconsidered 
its position on participating in the Lebanese cabinet. Currently, the group holds two 
positions in the Lebanese cabinet. 
In 2000, Israel made the unilateral decision to pull out of southern Lebanon, save 
the 25 square miles of the Sheba’a Farms region. While Israeli’s decision was largely 
based on domestic political concerns, Hizbullah’s continual attacks on Israel allowed the 
                                                
42 Robin B. Wright, Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East (New York: The Penguin Press, 
2008), 173. 
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group to claim that it had done what no other Arab group had had the ability to do – it 
had defeated the Zionist entity and forced its withdrawal. As a result, Hizbullah’s 
popularity throughout the Arab world skyrocketed, and Nasrallah’s in particular. 
ORGANIZATION AND PHILOSOPHY 
Heavily influenced by Iran, Hizbullah’s philosophy on legitimate leadership stems 
from the concept of wilaayat al-faqih, which guided the Iranian Revolution. Three core 
tenets direct Hizbullah’s goals and missions: the aforementioned legitimate leadership; 
the role of Islam in creating and propagating more-fulfilling and sustaining lives; and 
resistance to the Israeli occupation. 43  Yet despite Iran’s ideological and financial 
influence, as well as support from Syria, Hizbullah has traditionally maintained that it is a 
Lebanese organization. Some scholars point to the lack of foreign fighters in the 
organization as a hallmark of this identity.44  
Hizbullah is highly structured, hierarchical organization that functions under the 
collective leadership of the group’s Majlis as-Shuura (Consultative Council). The Majlis 
as-Shuura is made up of seven elected officials,45  including the secretary-general. 
Although in theory the secretary-general is an elected office, direction from Iran can 
preempt these rules. As a result, despite the two-term limit on the position, Nasrallah has 
served five terms as Hizbullah’s Secretary-General. As a result, Nasrallah has become 
“the central actor in almost all of Hizbullah’s political and military decision making.”46 
The below figure illustrates Hizbullah’s hierarchical nature, as well as the ways in 
which the organization is divided. The three noted regions (Beirut, Biq’a, and South 
Lebanon) demonstrate where the Lebanese Shi’ite communities are concentrated. The 
                                                
43 Qassem, 19. 
44 Mehdi Mozaffari, "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept," in Islamic Political Thought 
and Governance, ed. Abdullah Saeed, vol. IV of Critical Concepts in Political Science (London: 
Routledge, 2011), 294. 
45 Hizbullah’s Central Council, al-Majlis al-Markazi, which is comprised of 200 party founders and cadres, 
elects the members of the Consultative Council through a three stage process. For more information, see: 
Hamzeh (2004), 45-48. 
46 Hamzeh (2004), 48. 
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chart also illustrates the extent to which Hizbulalh is involved in both political and 
military operations; for example, the Islamic Health Unit administers Hizbullah’s 
hospitals, while the military and security apparatus mirrors the role of the army and the 
police force.  
 
Figure 1: Hizbullah’s organizational chart47 
                                                
47 Hamzeh (2004), 46. 
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Since 1992, the group has had both a political and military wing. As a result, 
Hizbullah remains the preeminent military force in southern Lebanon, but also 
participates regularly in the Lebanese political system. The organization has steadily 
increased its power through the electoral system. Some analysts note that “[t]he group 
continues to field candidates in national and municipal elections, and it has achieved 
modest, variable, yet steady degree of electoral success.”48  
SAYYID HASSAN NASRALLAH, HIZBULLAH’S SECRETARY-GENERAL 
Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, was born into an 
impoverished Shi’ite family in Beirut in 1960, where he showed an interest in religion at 
an early age. With the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in in 1975, Nasrallah and his 
siblings returned to their ancestral family home in in southern Lebanon, where he 
completed his schooling.  
After finishing his secondary education, Nasrallah joined the Harakat al-
MaHruumiin. Nasrallah’s involvement in the movement garnered attention and respect; 
from a young age, he was entrusted with significant organizational responsibilities. 
However, in 1976, under the guidance of mentors at his local mosque, Nasrallah left 
Lebanon and journeyed to Iraq to study at the famed Shi’ite seminary in Najaf. During 
this time, Nasrallah met Abbas Moussawi, the future founder of Hizbullah. Moussawi 
brought Nasrallah into his fold and began instructing him in his religious studies. 
Nasrallah has described Moussawi as a “friend, brother, mentor, and companion.”49 
In 1978, Iraqi politics forced Nasrallah to return to Lebanon; the ruling secular 
Ba’athist party had begun cracking down on and arresting Shi’ites, and particularly 
Lebanese Shi’ites in Najaf. Upon returning, Nasrallah continued working with Amal, 
where he was widely respected and headed the Biqaa’ division of the party. However, 
                                                
48 Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, 
R41446 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2011), 3. 
49 Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, ed. Nicholas Noe, trans. Ellen Khouri 
(London: Verso, 2007), 3. 
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when Moussawi broke off from Amal to form Hizbullah, Nasrallah and a number of his 
colleagues followed.  
In 1992, after Moussawi was assassinated by Israel, Nasrallah assumed the 
position of secretary-general. Unlike his predecessor, Nasrallah subscribed to the 
importance of participating in the political system and adjusted Hizbullah’s practices to 
accommodate this strategic vision. According to scholar Nizar Hamza, “Nasrallah 
considered political power in Lebanon to be no less important than placing the country 
under Sharia (Islamic) law…political power was on a par with military power.”50 Under 
his leadership, Hizbullah has realized significant electoral and political gains and 
entrenched itself in the domestic political arena. 
Since he assumed the role of secretary-general, Nasrallah has been widely 
perceived as a charismatic and engaging leader. A powerful orator, he has the ability to 
command and maintain an audience. While he generally speaks in Modern Standard 
Arabic while giving formal addresses, thereby indicating his Arabic capabilities and 
education, he will occasionally utilize Levantine Arabic to connect with the audience. He 
is a serious speaker, though not somber; while he rarely makes jokes during his speeches, 
he turns to levity when appropriate. Perhaps most importantly, he is able to empathize 
and identify with his audiences. For example, when his son, Hadi, was killed by the 
Israelis in 1997, Nasrallah declared, “[w]e in the leadership of Hezbollah do not spare our 
children and save him for the future…[w]e pride ourselves when our sons reach the front 
line, and we stand heads held high when they fall as martyrs.”51 He is, according to 
journalist Robin Wright, “a man of God, gun, and government, a cross between Iranian 
revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini and Latin America’s Che Guevara, a mix of 
charismatic Islamic populist and a wily guerilla tactician.”52 
                                                
50 Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 33. 
51 Wright, 181. 
52 Ibid, 159. 
 
 
 21 
He has also notably and effectively manipulated media to Hizbullah’s advantage; 
this was a large part of his strategy during the 2006 war. Israeli scholars Harel and 
Issacharoff observe that, “[Nasrallah] made use of the Lebanese media and Hezbollah 
communication channels in order to transmit sharp and clear messages regarding the 
[2006] war with Israel, the organization’s identity, and its ties with Lebanon.”53  
Nasrallah’s popularity extends throughout the Middle East. A poll conducted in 
Egypt, which is largely Sunni, asked individuals to name their two favorite political 
leaders. Nasrallah was the first choice; Mahmoud Ahmedinijad was the second.54 His 
speeches are sold on CDs and DVDs; many download lines from his speeches as cell 
phone ring tones.55 His intellectual prowess, media savvy, and ability to straddle both the 
religious and political worlds contribute to his ability to effectively and legitimately lead 
Hizbullah. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon once referred to Nasrallah as  
“…the shrewdest leader in the Arab world – and the most dangerous.”56 
SOCIAL WELFARE  
 Since its inception, Hizbullah has established an extensive and far-reaching 
network of social services. While the majority of Hizbullah’s social service organizations 
are located in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the southern part of Lebanon, and the 
Biqaa’ Valley, the party provides services throughout the country. Thus, while the 
majority of their services are directed at the Shi’ite population, the greater Lebanese 
population also benefits significantly.  
 Hizbullah’s services vary widely. The organization provides health clinics, 
educational opportunities, childcare and orphanages, food, and housing to those in need.57  
                                                
53 Harel and Issacharoff, 34. 
54 Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, ed. Nicholas Noe, trans. Ellen Khouri 
(London: Verso, 2007), 1. 
55 Wright, 159-160. 
56 Ibid, 160. 
57 A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Hizballah: Islamic Charity in Lebanon," in Understanding Islamic Charities, ed. Jon 
B. Alterman and Karim von Hippel (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2007), 131.  
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It pays special attention to those who fight for the group, giving financial support to the 
injured and those families whose relatives have been killed in resistance activities. In 
keeping with the group’s Islamic character, Hizbullah purports to follow the Qur’anic 
dictum that all charity funds must go towards social welfare and the way of Allah. In 
some interpretations, this includes armed and political jihad.58 
 While much of the funding for these programs comes from the khoms and zakat, 
or alms, that Hizbullah collects annually, Iran heavily subsidizes the provided services. 
Additionally, Hizbullah has invested in multiple business ventures, both legal and 
otherwise. For example, while the organization operates a number of grocery stores 
throughout Lebanon, it is also heavily involved in narcotics trafficking and arms trade.   
Both during and after the 2006 war, Hizbullah demonstrated and utilized the 
extent of its social welfare network to its fullest. During the war, Hizbullah provided 
many required services, including trash collection and supplying water. The group also 
took responsibility for a number of construction projects and repaired hospitals, civic 
centers, and schools (particularly in Beirut).59 Iran assisted in these endeavors, providing 
Hizbullah with sufficient funding so that the group was able to distribute $10,000 to 
eligible organization members, thereby ensuring that supporters had rent money for a 
year.60 By spearheading the rehabilitation efforts, Hizbullah reinforced the perception that 
it had the ability to provide for the Lebanese more effectively than the official Lebanese 
government could. As a result, social service provision has and continues to be integral to 
Hizbullah’s survival and popularity. Nizar Hamzeh observes that, “a cyclical relationship 
exists in which the social service cycle is a major force for transforming society. 
Hizballah’s social services network has created a unique type of clientalism that is 
                                                
58 Ibid, 143. 
59 Ibid, 132. 
60 Ibid.  
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supported and reinforced by patrons’ and clients’ shared faith in a primordial framework 
of community sharing.”61 
STRATEGIC MEDIA 
 Hizbullah heavily utilizes the media to facilitate recruitment and outreach. Eyal 
Zisser, an Israeli scholar, notes that “Hizbullah has always been obsessed by its own 
media coverage.” 62  Presently, Hizbullah’s media conglomerate includes: a monthly 
magazine entitled Qubthut Allah (The Fist of God); a radio station named al-Nour (The 
Light); a weekly newspaper, al-Intiqad (The Criticism); and, most well-known, a 
television station called al-Manar (The Lighthouse/The Beacon). The organization also 
runs a number of websites, including its homepage, al-Moqawama (The Resistance). 
 Al-Manar, which is headquartered in Beirut, has traditionally provided Hizbullah 
with its greatest strategic capacity. Established in 1991, “the bulk of the station’s 
programming was aimed at sustaining and, if possible, strengthening the Lebanese 
public’s support for Hezbollah’s campaign of resistance again (sic) the IDF [Israeli 
Defense Force] in south Lebanon, while at the same time pressuring Israeli viewers to 
push their governments for a unilateral withdrawal.”63 The station, which provides 24-
hour programming, broadcasts both terrestrially and via satellite. As a result, it is able to 
target and tweak its programming both for its local audiences, which include the 
Lebanese and those in northern Israel,64 as well as a global audience.65 As Hizbullah 
grew, the station shifted from focusing primarily on Lebanese audiences to Arab 
                                                
61 Ibid, 143. 
62 Eyal Zisser, "The Return of Hizbullah," Middle East Quarterly IX, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 5. 
63 Maura Conway, "Terrorism and the Making of the 'New Middle East': New Media Strategies of 
Hezbollah and al Qaeda," in New Media and the New Middle East, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007), 239-240. 
64 Al-Manar’s signal reaches approximately 30 miles into Israel, reaching Haifa. See: Conway, 242. 
65 Some estimates suggest that al-Manar had 10 million viewers globally in 2003 and 2004. See: Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Department of State, 2005), 100 in Conway, 251. 
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audiences overall; the station has advertised itself as “Qanat al-‘Arab wa al-Muslimiin,” 
or “the channel of Arabs and Muslims.”66 
 Lebanese television largely reflects the sectarian society. In 1996, the Lebanese 
government licensed five television stations, each of which was associated with a 
particular sect.67 Al-Manar was not one of the stations licensed; however, the station was 
allowed to continue broadcasting because both Syrian and Lebanese officials viewed as 
an integral part of the mission to resist Israeli occupation. 
 Al-Manar produces much of its own programming, allowing it to control and 
instill its messaging in all of its shows. Programming largely focuses on fighting the 
Zionist entity, amplifying anti-American sentiment, supporting the Palestinians, and 
encouraging individuals to join the resistance. By some estimates, half of the station’s 
programming focuses on the Palestinian struggle.68 
The programming targets a wide variety of demographics and includes “news, 
talk shows, documentary series, propaganda music videos, and other elements.”69 The 
channel also provides viewers with opportunities to donate money to Hizbullah, although 
it is widely believed that most funding for the station comes from Iran. 
 Al-Manar played an integral role in the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah. 
Israel, noting the station’s role in disseminating Hizbullah’s message, bombed the Beirut 
headquarters on July 13, 2006. Hizbullah’s programming continued uninterrupted, 
causing the Israeli Air Force to bomb the station a second time. Although the strikes 
                                                
66 Avi Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah's al-Manar Television (Washington, D.C.: Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 27. 
67 These stations include: Tele-Liban (government-owned); Lebanese Broadcasting Company International 
(Maronite); al-Mustaqbal, or Future Television (Sunni); Murr Television (Greek Orthodox); and the 
National Broadcasting Network (Shi’ite). For more information on each of these stations, see: Jorisch, 24.  
68 Robert Fisk, "Television News Is Secret Weapon of the Intifada," The Independent, December 2, 2000 in 
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weakened the signal, al-Manar continued its broadcast nearly uninterrupted for the 
entirety of the 34-day war.70 Nasrallah used the channel as the megaphone through which 
he addressed his audiences and responded to the Israeli attacks. In one particularly 
effective use of the channel, Nasrallah proclaimed that he was looking at an Israeli naval 
ship and ordered a strike on it. Within five minutes, al-Manar showed real-time footage 
of an Israeli Navy corvette burning as the result of two missile strikes.  
 After the 2006 war, a number of countries banned al-Manar. However, because 
Hizbullah has increasingly turned to web platforms to disseminate its message and attract 
supporters, the station now streams online, allowing the group to circumvent the bans. 
This online programming is largely in Arabic, but occasionally available in French, 
English, and Hebrew. Al-Manar remains Nasrallah’s official platform and continues to be 
popular throughout the Arab world. 
CONCLUSION 
Hizbullah is a well-organized and extensive organization with both political and 
military wings. The group’s success, largely derived from its ability to provide for its 
constituencies and its perceived victory against Israel in 2000, has made it one of the 
foremost actors in the Middle East. In addition to these social and tactical victories, 
Secretary-General Nasrallah, widely lauded for his rhetorical abilities, has been largely 
credited for using the media and public addresses to reinforce Hizbullah’s credibility and 
relevance. In order to fully understand the ways in which Hizbullah functions and 
legitimizes itself, it becomes necessary to analyze the way in which its leader addresses 
its constituencies. 
  
                                                
70 On occasion, Israel was able to intercept al-Manar’s signal and use the channel to broadcast its own 
imagery; this was part of the psychological operations campaign the Israelis employed during the war.  
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Chapter 3: The 2006 Israel-Hizbullah War71 
INTRODUCTION 
This section provides a brief overview of the war between Israel and Hizbullah, 
noting the strategic choices that both Israel and Hizbullah made during the 34-day 
conflict. This summary includes a particular focus on how Nasrallah utilized the media 
and his communications throughout the war.   
The remainder of the chapter focuses on the statements that Nasrallah made 
throughout the war. Using content analysis, I demonstrate the ways in which Nasrallah 
legitimized himself and Hizbullah’s mission, communicated with his various 
constituencies, and navigated through a conflict in which there was no clear military 
victory. This analysis illustrates that Nasrallah framed his comments within three 
overarching themes: an “us versus them” narrative; the fulfillment of a divinely inspired 
mission; and Hizbullah’s role as the defender and provider of the Lebanese. I also 
demonstrate that Nasrallah sought to minimize divisions within his constituencies by 
focusing on commonly-held values, such as dignity and solidarity. 
THE 2006 WAR: A RECOUNTING 
On July 12, 2006, shortly after 9 A.M., Hizbullah fighters attacked two Israeli 
Humvees patrolling the Israeli side of the Israeli-Lebanese border. Immediately after the 
ambush, Hizbullah launched an artillery attack on an Israeli border settlement and nearby 
military installations. In the chaos, Hizbullah had the opportunity to abduct two Israeli 
soldiers, Udi Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. An additional eight were killed in the 
ambush. Hizbullah stated that its goals included forcing the release of Lebanese prisoners 
from Israeli prisons and demonstrating solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza following 
Israel’s June 2006 raids. 
                                                
71 Other names for the war include: the 2006 Lebanon War; the July War (in Lebanon); and the Second 
Lebanon War (in Israel). 
 
 
 27 
The attack was not entirely unsurprising. Since Israel’s withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon in 2000 (with the exception of the 25 square miles surrounding the Sheba’a 
Farms), Israel and Hizbullah had largely maintained a quiet, albeit tense, relationship. 
However, relations between the two began deteriorating in 2005. Hizbullah attempted to 
kidnap several Israeli soldiers from the border village of Ghajar in November 2005. 
Israeli officials, who were growing increasingly annoyed with Hizbullah’s taunting after 
the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, learned that the group was in the 
process of developing “’first strike’ capacity to unleash massive, preemptive rocket 
attempts on Israel.”72 Although Nasrallah publically stated that the summer would be 
“quiet” in June 2006, tensions between the two grew.  
Following the abduction, Israel responded with a massive air campaign, aimed at 
crippling Lebanon’s ability to function. On July 13, 2006, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) 
bombed the Rafik Hariri International Airport in Beirut and instituted a naval blockade. 
The IAF also struck al-Manar’s headquarters in Beirut and Nasrallah’s office, though 
Nasrallah and other senior Hizbullah officials had gone into hiding. Additional targets 
included bridges in southern and central Lebanon, cellular phone antennas, oil reserves 
and gasoline stations.73 By the second week of the war, Israel bolstered its initial air 
campaign with ground forces. The damage in Lebanon was extensive.   
Hizbullah’s status as a non-state political actor complicated Israel’s responses. 
Accounts indicate that the Israeli government considered three distinct options for 
retaliation: strike Hizbullah only; strike Hizbullah and strategic Syrian targets; and/or 
strike Hizbullah and the infrastructure in Lebanon.74 Israel held the Lebanese government 
responsible for their inability to control Hizbullah, and thus coordinated an attack meant 
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to cripple the country. Hizbullah’s decisions had real, and powerful, foreign policy 
implications. 
Lebanese politicians recognized the implications of Hizbullah’s attack and 
scrambled to limit the impact of the group’s decision. The government, led by Prime 
Minister Fouad Siniora, moved to distance itself from the attack and disavowed 
Hizbullah’s actions. Lebanese Minister of Information, Ghazi al-‘Aridi, stated, “the 
government of Lebanon knew nothing of this morning’s incident and is not responsible 
for it.”75 Others within the March 14 coalition, which is comprised of both Sunni and 
Christian members, followed suit and decried the attack.  
Israel’s overarching goal involved isolating and destroying Hizbullah. However, 
despite Israel’s attempts, three factors largely precluded the country from realizing its 
goals: Israel’s mission was poorly defined and overly ambitious; Hizbullah had 
accumulated a large arms cache and trained to use increasingly sophisticated tactics; and 
the Israeli government had a poor tactical and strategic understanding of the group. Over 
the course of the war, Hizbullah launched more than 4,000 rockets and projectiles into 
Israel and engaged in ground combat with 30,000 Israeli troops.76 After the war, Israeli 
officials widely acknowledged that they had misjudged the extent to with Hizbullah had 
developed and honed their military abilities.  
NASRALLAH, THE WAR, AND THE MEDIA 
Although neither side scored a military victory, Nasrallah’s ability to manipulate 
the media allowed Hizbullah to continue garnering support throughout the war. 
Nasrallah, in keeping with his keen appreciation of the crucial importance of the war of 
narratives, claimed to have achieved a “strategic and historic victory.”77 According to 
scholar Reinoud Leenders:  
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Hizbullah consciously focused on accumulating what may be called symbolic 
capital, which it sensed would enable it to legitimately and convincingly impose 
its views concerning the various political crises and violence pertaining the region 
at large. Such views included those regarding the wicked designs for a “new” 
Middle East by Israel and the US, regarding Lebanon’s quandary since Syria’s 
withdrawal of troops in 2005 and, foremost, concerning the party’s own role in 
resisting foreign encroachment and enhancing Arab and Lebanese steadfastness. 
In brief, the war enabled Hizbullah to carve out for itself and its military agenda a 
social and political space that, prior to this war and due to a host of reasons, had 
become dangerously narrow.78  
Over the course of the war, Nasrallah delivered seven speeches on al-Manar. 
These speeches occurred on the following dates: July 12, July 14, July 25, July 29, 
August 9, August 12, and August 14.79 A press conference followed the July 12 speech, 
providing members of the media with an opportunity to question Hizbullah. However, 
Nasrallah did not deliver any of the remaining speeches in public. Security concerns 
dictated that he remain in hiding.  
Befitting the circumstances, Nasrallah framed his message with three particular 
themes: the “us versus them” narrative; the fulfillment of a divinely inspired mission, also 
known as the NasR ilaahi, or divine triumph theme; and Hizbullah’s role as the defender 
and protector of the Lebanese and the Palestinians. Nasrallah repeatedly qualified 
Hizbullah’s mission as defensive.80 Nasrallah often used language generally reserved for 
the nation-state, particularly when he spoke about protecting the nation and providing for 
the Lebanese after the war. Across these themes, he chose his words to foster a sense of 
community and common purpose and generally avoided using either religious or ethnic 
sectarian terminology. His remarks were largely inclusive and appealed to a wide swath 
of supporters; he structured his religious comments to appeal to both the Muslim and the 
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Christian communities. Additionally, he often appealed to values widely held through the 
Arab world, including the sense of karaama, or dignity, and taDamun, or solidarity, in 
his remarks.  
The “Us Versus Them” Narrative 
Nasrallah consistently utilized the “us versus them” narrative throughout his 
speeches, a common theme in Hizbullah-produced media. Depending on his audience, the 
“us” included Hizbullah supporters, the Lebanese, the Palestinians, and/or the overall 
Arab population. The “them” generally referred to Israel, the United States, or the United 
States and Israel in tandem.  
Nasrallah’s initially utilized the “us versus them” narrative during his first speech 
of the war, shortly after he explained the reasoning and operations behind that morning’s 
attack. He spoke explicitly about the Israeli government, saying:  
 
If the Israel enemy wants an escalation and thinks it can make Lebanon pay the 
price, then we are ready for a confrontation to the farthest limit this enemy and the 
ones behind it may imagine. The Israelis currently in power include Olmert, who 
is a new prime minister. There are also a new defence minister and new chief of 
staff. I advise them before they meet at 2000 to ask the former presidents and 
ministers about their experience in Lebanon. When one is still new, he may be 
cheated. In order not to be cheated, they should first ask and make sure.81 
 
Later, in one of the most famous statements of the war, Nasrallah addressed the 
Israeli population explicitly on July 14. His declaration followed the initial days of the 
IAF air campaign, which quickly inflicted significant, and unexpected, damage on 
Lebanon. As a result, Nasrallah challenged the Israelis with the following threat: 
You wanted an open war; we are going to an open war and we are ready for it. It 
will be a war on every level, to Haifa, and believe me, beyond Haifa, and beyond, 
beyond Haifa. We will not be the only ones to pay the price or have our houses 
destroyed, our children killed and our people driven out of their homes. Those 
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days are over and were in the past, before 1982 and 2000. I promise you that those 
days are over. You will be responsible for what your government did.82  
As the war progressed, Nasrallah expanded the “us versus them” theme to 
highlight the clash between Lebanon and the American-Israeli axis. On July 25, Nasrallah 
addressed the entire Lebanese population, saying:  
 
"Our brothers, today, the plan based on which the war was waged and designed 
aims to bring Lebanon back to the circle of US-Israeli control and hegemony. 
This would be worse than the 1982 incursion and 17 May agreement. What they 
want is that Lebanon would depart from and leave behind its history, obligations, 
culture and true identity in order that Lebanon would become an American-
Zionist state run by America and Israel through Lebanese obedient and helpless 
figures.83 
 
A few days later, on July 29, Nasrallah underscored the camaraderie between the 
Lebanese and the Palestinians as they worked towards the common goal of defeating 
Israel. He mused that: 
This explains to us the statement of Shimon Peres in which he said that it is a 
battle of life or death for Israel. He certainly does not mean that the resistance in 
Lebanon will enter Palestine, liberate Palestine, and eliminate and destroy the 
entity. However, he knows full well that this wonderful Lebanese steadfastness 
and this valiancy, if it is crowned with victory, will destroy the haughtiness, 
mighty arrogance, and the spirit on which his entity was established, and 
consequently, this entity will have no future. This is the story of life and death in 
the battle Israel is waging now. When the people of this transient state lose their 
confidence in their legendary army, the end of this entity will begin…when they 
feel that this army is impotent, weak, defeated, humiliated, and failed, the issue 
will be one of life or death.84 
 
By utilizing the “us versus them” mentality, Nasrallah legitimized himself in two 
specific ways. First, by placing himself as the counterweight to two roundly despised 
entities, the state of Israel and the American government, he automatically imbued 
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himself with a sense of moral authority. He communicated that Hizbullah, despite 
instigating the war and inflicting significant damage on the Lebanese, continued to fight 
for the greater good. As the face of Hizbullah, he represented this struggle for betterment 
and empowerment.  
Additionally, Nasrallah’s rhetoric indicated that he would not be cowed into 
submission. By continuing to stand up to Israel, and occasionally the Americans, he 
reminded his followers of Hizbullah’s success in forcing Israel’s retreat from Lebanon. 
This feat, which no other Arab government had been able to accomplish, conferred a 
mantle of legitimacy and respect on his leadership capabilities. 
The Divinely Inspired Mission 
In many of his speeches, Nasrallah proclaimed that Hizbullah, its fighters, and its 
supporters, were working in tandem to fulfill a divinely inspired mission and achieve a 
divine triumph. From the inception of the war, Nasrallah signaled to his followers that 
God sanctioned the mission, thereby laying out its celestial nature. In his July 12 speech 
and press conference at the start of the war, Nasrallah exclaimed: 
We will go to it with firm determination, strong faith, and confidence in the 
victory that will be granted by the almighty God. I know that all the honest and 
faithful Lebanese people as well as the Arab and Islamic peoples and all free and 
honourable people in the world stand by our side. We are not at all isolated. The 
one who sides with the enemy will be the one isolated by this nation. The one 
who sides with the resistance will be the one who acts in harmony with this 
nation. This is my message to the enemy.85 
 
He varied the placement of these invocations throughout his speeches. For 
example, although Nasrallah generally opened his speeches with the customary “In the 
name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate,” he would occasionally draw out this 
supplication. At the beginning of his July 29 speech, Nasrallah proclaimed to his 
audience: 
God Almighty says in His glorious Book: In the name of God, the merciful, the 
compassionate, 'Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their 
goods; for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise): they fight in His cause, 
and slay and are slain: a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Law, the 
Gospel, and the Koran: and who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah. then 
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rejoice in the bargain which ye have concluded: that is the achievement 
supreme.'86 
At other times, Nasrallah reminded his audience about the goal of divine triumph 
near the end of the speech, a move that was likely meant to leave his viewers with a 
heightened sense of motivation. For example, when concluding his August 9 speech, 
Nasrallah spoke directly to those fighting on behalf of Hizbullah, saying: 
 
To every mujahid in the resistance today, to every mujahid who is still fighting 
and to every mujahid who is lurking in wait and is waiting; to all those heroes 
who are alive, who kept their promise to God and never changed and will not 
change, God willing, I say the words of their emir, God's blessings be upon him: 
Plant your feet firm in the ground. The mountains will move, but you won't. Lend 
God your skull and look at the farthest side of the enemy ranks, and know that 
victory is granted by the Almighty God.87 
Nasrallah did not reserve the invocation of the divine for people. He also 
suggested Allah blessed Hizbullah’s tactical maneuvers and technology. In one 
particularly memorable quotation, he proclaimed, “We assert to you that these rockets are 
guided by God and are guided technically.”88  
Of particular note, when Nasrallah invoked the divine mission, he rarely referred 
specifically to Islam. Instead, he either spoke generally or peppered his speeches with 
references to which both Muslims and Christians could connect. For example, in 
Nasrallah’s July 29 speech, he declared:  
 
It will be a victory for every Arab, Muslim, Christian, and honorable person in the 
world who stood against the aggression and defended Lebanon by word, action, or 
support…[t]his victory will be a strong motive for us to embody our national 
unity, which our people embody these days and through which they embody the 
values of Jesus Christ, peace be upon him, and those of Prophet Muhammad, may 
God’s peace and blessings be upon him, in terms of solidarity, amity, support, 
cooperation, and love which was expressed by all people.89   
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By invoking the divine, Nasrallah had the ability to call on God to validate 
Hizbullah’s actions. By proxy, Nasrallah could argue that his leadership was divinely 
sanctioned, despite not being a particularly learned religious scholar. As a result, this 
divine inspiration conferred further legitimacy on his authority. 
Hizbullah, the Defender 
Throughout the conflict, Nasrallah often referred to Hizbullah as the defender of 
both the Lebanese and the Palestinians. By doing so, he accomplished two separate goals: 
to justify Hizbullah’s role in aiding the Lebanese Armed Forces and to refuse to disarm 
per Security Council Resolution 1701,90 which ended the war. Each of these tactics 
afforded Nasrallah legitimacy as the protector and vanguard of Lebanon. 
Throughout the conflict, Nasrallah asserted that Hizbullah remained the 
preeminent military force in the country. He used evidence of Hizbullah’s military and 
tactical capabilities, such as when the group struck the Israeli naval corvette in real time 
on al-Manar, to reinforce these statements and validate his claims. He did not deride the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) while maintaining Hizbullah’s stature. Instead, he openly 
acknowledged the role of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in protecting Lebanon, 
stating that Hizbullah supported the army and its deployment. Yet concurrently, he 
questioned the LAF’s ability to protect the nation, asking, “…[c]an the Lebanese Army, 
with its current conditions and capabilities, fight a war if a war is imposed on 
Lebanon?…this is an issue that is linked to the country’s destiny and the protection of the 
country, and we should not deal with it lightly or with such haste.”91  
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Similarly, Nasrallah underscored the need for Hizbullah to aid the army when he 
discussed the best way in which to protect Lebanon’s borders on August 9. According to 
Nasrallah: 
 
Deploying a regular army along the international borders directly face to face with 
an enemy that might at any time transgress is like placing this army in the mouth 
of a dragon or, as we say here in colloquial Arabic, face to face with the muzzle 
of a gun. An army that does not have tanks, armoured vehicles, air force or 
sufficient aerial cover might be destroyed in few days if it comes under any 
aggression. The battles that have thus far taken place in the south testify to this. 
The resistance has thus far been steadfast in Ayta al-Sha'b, Kfar Kila, Al-
Udaysah, Al-Tayibah, Bint Jubayl, Aytarun and in all frontline towns because it 
has no classical or regular presence there. It has a different way to be present 
there. It has no aerial cover. The Israeli enemy bombs, strikes and destroys, but it 
could not weaken the resolve of the mujahidin and their manoeuvrability. We care 
about the army in the border area. Yes, we agreed in the government - and I will 
return to our considerations shortly - to the deployment of the army to the border 
area, but we do not hide our fear for it. Given its current status and capabilities, if 
we deploy the army in the border area and if the sticking issues between Lebanon 
and the Israeli enemy remain unresolved, particularly if Lebanon remains prone to 
the Israeli aerial, sea and ground violations which have never ceased since the 
Israeli withdrawal in 2000, this means that we will place the army directly in the 
mouth of the dragon.92 
 From this discourse, it is clear that Nasrallah viewed Hizbullah as the true 
protector and defender of Lebanon. In many ways, he could easily support this claim; 
Hizbullah was, and continues to be, better armed and trained than the Lebanese Armed 
Forces. It forced Israel to leave when no one else had the ability to do so. Its fighters 
possess sophisticated military prowess. Additionally, by championing Hizbullah’s role as 
the main defender, Nasrallah legitimized his own leadership. The most basic role of the 
state is to provide national security for its people; it appears that Nasrallah felt that he 
filled that void in Lebanon.  
U.N. Security Council Resolution (U.N.S.C.R.) 1701, which ended the war, called 
on Hizbullah to disarm. Historically, Hizbullah has rejected disarmament; for example, 
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although the Ta’if Accords called for all Lebanese armed militias to disarm, Hizbullah 
was allowed to keep its weapons so that it could continue with its mission of resistance. 
Despite Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, this exception for Hizbullah remains. 
Therefore, the language of U.N.S.C.R. 1701 compelled Nasrallah to discuss, and 
then refuse, disarmament. In tandem both with Hizbullah’s role as both the resistance and 
the defender, Nasrallah flatly rejected the possibility of disarmament, stating: 
 
Some people said that they wanted Hezbollah to hand over its weapons to the 
state. Have those great people liberated Shab'a Farms and secured the return of 
people to their lands in Shab'a Farms? Do they ask us to hand over our weapons 
because they freed prisoners? Do they come to us with real guarantees of 
protecting Lebanon against the Israeli enemy, which is still threatening? Olmert 
was levelling threats before I came to have this message recorded. Lebanon is still 
being threatened and might be attacked any time. Who will defend this country? 
Who will teach the enemy a lesson? Who will make the enemy pay a heavy price? 
Today, we can proudly say that if any Israeli government decides to launch war in 
the future, it will take into consideration that war with Lebanon will not be a 
picnic. War with Lebanon will be very costly in terms of human, material and 
economic losses, as well as in terms of the loss of dignity and image.93 
 
 Nasrallah’s dismissal of disarmament allowed him to signal two distinct, yet 
related messages. First, he rejected the authority of the Security Council, which he had 
previously excoriated for its refusal to charge Israel with war crimes as a result of its 
conduct, particularly after the Qana massacre.94 Additionally, he maintained Hizbullah’s 
sovereignty and identity, for how can a resistance movement achieve its goals if forced to 
give up its armaments? By protecting Hizbullah’s identity and mission, Nasrallah further 
demonstrated his commitment to the cause and reinforced his own legitimacy. 
Hizbullah, the Provider 
Nasrallah necessarily focused on the role of Hizbullah as the defender in the 
beginning of the conflict. As a corollary, he also discussed the role of Hizbullah as the 
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provider, when he largely referred to the ways in which Hizbullah had acted as a stopgap 
for the government. For example, in his speech on July 12, he commented generally on 
the ways in which Hizbullah might support the official Lebanese government as it 
provided for its citizens, saying: “We have called and continue to call and repeat that the 
country needs a national unity government and this is our logic and stand. But while we 
call for a national unity government, we remain ready to cooperate on all files, on the 
electricity, social security, water, and other files as well as the minimum wages.”95 
As the war drew to a close and issues of the post-war reconstruction surfaced, 
Nasrallah brought increased focus to the narrative of Hizbullah as the provider. This 
emphasis is unsurprising; a central tenet of Hizbullah’s strategy and recruitment centers 
on the provision of social services. During the war, Hizbullah continued to provide 
essential services, such as trash collection and running water. It stepped in where the 
government was unable to operate. These weaknesses did not go unmentioned. While 
Nasrallah continuously called for cooperation and support from the Lebanese government 
and recognized the role of the government in supporting the state, he spoke bluntly about 
the government’s limitations and role of Hizbullah in providing for the Lebanese. By 
doing so, he defined the relationship between Hizbullah and the government as a 
supportive and competitive one simultaneously. 
The best example of this language comes from two stanzas of Nasrallah’s August 
14 speech, when he addressed the question of how to best begin rebuilding the country. 
According to Nasrallah: 
 
Regarding the houses that were damaged but are still habitable, starting tomorrow 
morning, the brothers in the towns, villages, and cities will take the initiative and 
will contact and visit the owners of these homes to offer direct and swift 
assistance in order to kick start the restoration of these homes back to a habitable 
state as fast as possible. As for the demolished homes - the harder issue - I wish to 
first reassure these honourable families that they need not worry. What I said in 
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the first days of the war was not simply meant to boost your steadfastness. No, 
today is the day I keep my word and fulfill this promise. God willing, you will not 
need to ask for help, stand in any lines, or go to certain places; our brothers, who 
are your brothers and sons, in all areas, towns, villages and neighbourhoods will, 
God willing, come to your service starting tomorrow morning. 
 
We will work together on this matter. We cannot of course wait for the 
government and its heavy vehicles and machinery because they could be a while, 
at any rate, the government's movements will come to light in the near future, but 
what we can do is work together along two simultaneous tracks starting 
tomorrow. The first being securing a reasonable sum of money for each family to 
help it rent a house for a year and buy decent and suitable furniture for this house, 
because the reconstruction of houses and apartment buildings requires months, 
and the natural alternative for now is for people to rent and furnish houses. This 
will start tomorrow, and I can say that in the coming few days, all these cases, 
even though great in number and serous, will be covered. So far, the initial count 
available to us on completely demolished houses exceeds 15,000 residential units. 
We understand that this is a monumental and serious affair, but, God willing, we 
have enough resolve for this task and achievement.96 
 
By laying out this agenda and defining Hizbullah’s role as the provider, Nasrallah 
accomplished two specific and interconnected goals. First, he reminded the Lebanese of 
Hizbullah’s power relative to that of the official Lebanese government, despite the 
destruction levied during a war that Hizbullah instigated. He asserted that Hizbullah 
would more effectively and efficiently respond to the needs of the Lebanese – a claim on 
which the group followed through. Second, he assured individuals that they would be 
taken care of – and, as discussed in Chapter Two – Hizbullah had the resources to keep 
these promises. As a result, Hizbullah retained its legitimacy, both on its own and in 
comparison to the Lebanese government. Nasrallah’s ability to suggest that Hizbullah 
was the true defender and provider, and then follow through on his promises, legitimized 
both the group and himself as a leader.  
Emphasis on Dignity and Solidarity 
Throughout the conflict, Nasrallah repeatedly discussed the importance of dignity 
amongst Hizbullah’s constituencies. His emphasis on these two features highlighted the 
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values that he wished to impart to his supporters; he discussed both in every speech that 
he gave throughout the war.   
Dignity 
The concept of “dignity” played a recurring role in Nasrallah’s rhetoric, where he 
often paired the importance of dignity in contrast to the devastation of humiliation. For 
example, in Nasrallah’s speech on July 25, he stressed: 
 
I would like to assert that we can never accept any condition that will humiliate 
our country, people or resistance. Nor will we accept any formula that could come 
at the expense of national interests, sovereignty, independence, especially after all 
these sacrifices no matter how long the confrontation would last and regardless of 
the great sacrifices we will offer. Our true and basic motto is: Dignity first.97 
Later in the speech, he returned to the dichotomy of dignity and humiliation when 
discussing the material and psychological effects of the war. Nasrallah proclaimed that, 
“[t]he houses were destroyed and they will be rebuilt, God willing. The infrastructure was 
damaged and it will be rebuilt, God willing. However, we will not allow anybody to take 
away our dignity. We can never accept any humiliating conditions.”98 
 By focusing on the role of dignity, Nasrallah identified a particularly sensitive 
area in Arab culture. Since Israel’s establishment in 1948, humiliation has figured as a 
common theme in public discourse. The way in which the Israeli Defense Forces totally 
defeated the Arab armies first in 1948 and again in 1967 shocked and humiliated the 
Arabs. These losses resulted in an extended social discourse about the Arabs’ inferiority 
in the face of Israel’s successes. 
 Hizbullah’s perceived victory over Israel in 2000 damaged significantly the 
common perception that Israel’s defenses were impermeable. By defeating Israel, a feat 
which no other Arab army had managed, Hizbullah began to restore the collective 
dignity. As a result, Nasrallah’s emphasis on dignity served two purposes: first, it was an 
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unconscious reminder of Hizbullah’s previous successes. More importantly, it was a tacit 
recognition of the importance of dignity in a society that had long felt powerless and 
humiliated. By recognizing and vocalizing the value of dignity, Nasrallah identified and 
verbalized a need among his constituency, thereby contributing to his own power and 
authority.   
Solidarity 
 Similarly, the concept of solidarity played a central role in each of the seven 
speeches. Nasrallah’s definition of solidarity was fluid; at times, he referred specfically to 
the Lebanese, while in others he referenced the larger Arab population. Still at other 
times, he talked about the solidarity that existed between the Palestinians and the 
Lebanese. Simultaneously, he minimized his usage of sectarian terminology, 
underscoring the importance of solidarity throughout the conflict. 
During his initial address, Nasrallah focused specifically on the Lebanese when he 
delivered the following missive:  
 
"The following is my message to Lebanon. This is not the right time for one-
upmanship, discussions, and arguments in Lebanon. I am not asking anybody for 
support or backing, but I want to draw the attention of Lebanese people, including 
officials and non-officials, to refrain from acting in a way that would encourage 
the enemy against Lebanon or to speak or act in a way that would provide cover 
for the Israeli aggression against Lebanon. It is time for solidarity and cooperation 
to confront this obligation. We will later be ready for any discussion or argument. 
Beware of committing any mistake that may help, back, or support aggression. 
This is the time for national feelings and responsibility to prevail. We acted with a 
national sense of responsibility. You may discuss what is right or wrong with me 
and this is good, but the country is now facing an obligation. All should behave 
with a national sense of responsibility. The Lebanese Government should behave 
in a national sense of responsibility.99 
 The way in which Nasrallah singles out the Lebanese government when 
discussing solidarity suggests that he anticipated a lack of support. He was not incorrect 
to do so; although the Lebanese government eventually backed Nasrallah, many 
                                                
99 Nasrallah, July 12, 2006. 
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bureaucrats publicly distanced themselves from his actions at the beginning of the war. 
This quotation suggests that Nasrallah anticipated that this schism could rend Lebanese 
society and hoped to preempt that division, emphasizing the need for solidarity above all 
else. 
 Later, Nasrallah highlighted the importance of solidarity both among the 
Lebanese and the greater Arab community. On July 25, Nasrallah proclaimed: 
 
It will be a victory for every Arab, Muslim, Christian, and honourable person in 
the world who stood against the aggression and defended Lebanon by word, 
action, or support. This victory will be a strong motive for the resistance and its 
supporters to show more love and amity to all the Lebanese, particularly those 
who supported them in politics and in the media and those who received, 
embraced, and showed hospitality to them in Sidon, the northern Jabal Lubnan, 
the southern Jabal Lubnan, Beirut, the north, and Al-Biqa. This victory will be a 
motive for making Lebanon more beautiful than it was. Lebanon will be beautiful, 
yet strong and proud.100 
In tandem with his focus on solidarity, Nasrallah rarely used sectarian 
terminology in his rhetoric, instead preferring to emphasize the unity of Lebanon in the 
face of the Zionist threat. While he would occasionally refer to Shi’ite religious symbols, 
these references were minimal. Instead, he employed nationalist language that allowed 
him to underscore that the war was a shared Lebanese and/or Arab experience. By doing 
so, he intended to align the Arab world against Israel – a key strategy during a conflict 
when numerous Arab leaders, including Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saudi 
King Abdullah, had publically questioned his strategy and tactics in instigating the war. 
In doing so, Nasrallah presented himself as a counterweight, further legitimizing himself.  
Similarly, Nasrallah often referred to the Palestinians and the Lebanese as 
brothers, allowing for support and commiseration in the camaraderie. In one particularly 
poignant phrase, he said, “[i]n the name of all the pure blood spilled in Lebanon and 
Palestine by the Lebanese and Palestinians, particularly from the Shi’is and Sunnis, we 
                                                
100 Nasrallah, July 25, 2006. 
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appeal to you and tell you: Beloved and dear brothers, do not go too far in what you are 
doing.  The ones sewing enmity and hatred among you are the US occupation [in Iraq] 
and the Zionists.”101 As noted in the literature review, empathy for the plight of the 
Palestinians is considered a central ideology in Arab society and plays heavily into the 
establishment of legitimacy. While Hizbullah naturally identifies with the struggle of the 
Palestinians, viewing them as a brother resistance movement, Nasrallah’s verbal and 
continued identification with the Palestinians verified his stature as an Arab leader. 
CONCLUSION 
 Nasrallah’s skillful use of rhetoric and communication throughout the July 2006 
war evidenced his ability to address a wide variety of audiences simultaneously. The way 
in which he utilized these three particular themes, as well as his continued emphasis on 
communal values, underscored Hizbullah’s mission and, by extension, Nasrallah’s 
leadership. By shifting between these three themes, as well as tapering the message when 
necessary, Nasrallah was able to demonstrate that he knew how to guide and defend the 
Shi’ites, the Lebanese, the Palestinians, and the larger Arab world against the Zionist 
threat. 
                                                
101 Nasrallah, July 12, 2006. 
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Chapter 4: Nasrallah’s Rhetoric and U.S. Foreign Policy 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has provided military and financial support to Lebanon since 
the 1980s. Following the Cedar Revolution and the ensuing withdrawal of Syrian troops 
from Lebanon, the Bush Administration increased significantly the levels of aid provided.  
President Obama has continued with these policies, recognizing the importance of 
Lebanon in regional politics. 
U.S.-funded programs in Lebanon, which largely focus on providing security 
assistance and promoting democratization and civil society, have realized moderate 
successes. Yet their impact remains limited, which may result in part from Nasrallah’s 
messaging abilities. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Nasrallah often employs 
rhetoric that focuses on the “us versus them” narrative, the divine mission, the role of 
Hizbullah as the defender and the provider, and the importance of dignity and solidarity 
in Lebanese society. Yet there are ways in which this rhetoric is limiting, particularly 
given the current uprising in Syria and Nasrallah’s continued backing for Syrian 
President Bashar al-Asad. Thus, in order to more effectively combat Nasrallah’s appeal 
and legitimacy, as well as Hizbullah as an organization, the United States should focus its 
aid to Lebanon on strengthening the Lebanese security forces and countering Hizbullah’s 
vast social service network. The United States should also consider concentrating its 
public diplomacy initiatives on exploiting Nasrallah’s support for the Asad regime and 
providing aid to the anti-Syria March 14 coalition.  
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the history of the relationship 
between the United States and Hizbullah. I then discuss current U.S. policies in Lebanon, 
specifically noting the difficulties in implementation that have resulted because of 
Hizbullah and possible areas for improvement. I continue by reviewing challenges that 
Hizbullah, and Nasrallah in particular, is presently facing in the Middle East, and how 
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these difficulties may detract from the group’s authority and provide opportunities for the 
United States before offering some concluding thoughts on the future role of Hizbullah.  
THE UNITED STATES AND HIZBULLAH: A HISTORY 
The relationship between the United States and Hizbullah dates back to 1983, 
when Hizbullah bombed two American installments in Beirut: the U.S. embassy in April 
and the U.S. Marines barracks in October, which housed both American and French 
personnel. The attack against the embassy killed 63 and the bombing of the barracks 
killed 299, including 241 Americans. While Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for both 
bombings, evidence implicated Hizbullah. The group continues to deny its involvement 
in the attacks.  
Throughout the 1980s, Hizbullah’s participation in kidnappings and hijackings 
reinforced the enmity between the group and the United States. Hizbullah has also been 
accused of perpetrating the 1992 and 1994 bombings of the Israeli Embassy and Jewish 
centers in Argentina, although the group maintains that it was not involved.  
As a result, the U.S. State Department designated Hizbullah as a foreign terrorist 
organization (FTO) in 1997. State officials renewed this classification in 1999, in 
accordance with the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 219. Due to its FTO 
status, all material support for Hizbullah is illegal. The United States does not distinguish 
between the organization’s political or military wing.  
In an attempt to mitigate Hizbullah’s influence in Lebanon and the greater Middle 
East, the United States provides significant financial aid to the Lebanese government. 
This funding is largely predicated on strengthening Lebanon’s military and security 
forces, encouraging democratization, and building civil society. However, Hizbullah’s 
participation in the Lebanese government, where the group presently holds two cabinet 
posts and is part of the ruling coalition, complicates this aid.  
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NASRALLAH’S CURRENT CHALLENGES 
The regional unrest within the Middle East has presented Hizbullah, and 
Nasrallah in particular, with a new set of challenges. Hizbullah’s self-identification as a 
resistance movement has complicated its role within the uprisings of the Arab Spring. 
Nasrallah expressed support for the protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. In particular, 
he backed the protestors in Bahrain, given that the Bahraini Shi’ite population led the 
calls for change. Yet because of the patron-client relationship between Syria and 
Hizbullah, Nasrallah has continued to support Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, despite 
widespread reports that the regime has increasingly used brutality and violence against 
the protestors. Nasrallah has publicly justified this support for two reasons. First, he 
asserts that Syria is the only country in the Arab world capable of standing up to both the 
United States and Israel. Additionally, he argues that the Asad regime has pursued 
reforms internally, thus fulfilling the demands of those within the resistance movements. 
 Nasrallah’s continued support for Syria has damaged significantly his credibility 
throughout the region, and with Sunnis in particular. Between Nasrallah’s backing of 
Asad and the intra-governmental violence in 2008, Nasrallah is quickly losing the 
goodwill that he garnered after the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and 
the war in 2006. 
Given the current political situation in the Arab world, it is likely that Hizbullah 
will have to reassess its status as a political organization and decide the ways in which it 
will act as it moves forward.102 In one scenario, Hizbullah may instigate another conflict 
with Israel in order to detract attention from the uprising in Syria; it is likely that any 
bellicose acts would come at the urging of Syria or Iran. However, Hizbullah could run 
significant existential risk by choosing this path; despite widespread popular support for 
Hizbullah during the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, the conflict inflicted heavy 
                                                
102 For a more detailed discussion of these two options, see: Mona Yacoubian, “Hezbollah After Assad: 
Why the Fall of Damascus Might Compel Hezbollah to Turn Inward,” Foreign Affairs, December 1, 2011. 
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costs on Lebanon. Additionally, Lebanon has borne the brunt of the spillover from the 
Syrian uprising, further taxing the country. A renewed conflict with Israel, given the 
strain the Lebanese presently face, would likely be unpopular. 
Hizbullah might also choose to respond to the situation in Syria by turning inward 
and focusing on its domestic political agenda. By doing so, the organization could 
demonstrate its focus on Lebanon and attempt to negate criticisms that it is merely a 
puppet for Syria and Iran. Yet this strategy also carries some inherent risks; by focusing 
domestically, Hizbullah may have to redefine itself first as a political actor within 
Lebanon, instead of as a resistance movement. Given that Hizbullah’s funding and right 
to remain armed are predicated on the idea of resistance, as well as the party’s larger 
popularity, the group may not want to engage in any activities that minimize that aspect 
its identity. At present, Hizbullah has largely removed itself from the spotlight in order to 
wait out the crisis and minimize the damage to its own platform.  
As the crisis in Syria continues unabated, and geopolitical dynamics shift, it will 
be necessary to watch the ways in which Nasrallah presents himself and Hizbullah to its 
constituencies. By doing so, it will be possible to track what, if any, changes the group 
will embrace in order to sustain itself and its popularity. Having a better understanding of 
the previous ways in which Nasrallah communicated will shed light on the group’s future 
plans. 
 
HIZBULLAH AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Current U.S. policy towards Lebanon is largely based on four priorities: 
protecting Israel; strengthening existing Lebanese democratic institutions; minimizing 
Hizbullah’s support within Lebanon; and combating terrorism. Marginalizing Hizbullah 
and detracting from the group’s influence are key components of achieving these goals. 
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Following the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005 and the 2006 
war between Israel and Hizbullah, the Bush Administration requested a significant 
increase in funds to support Lebanon. The Obama Administration has continued this 
policy and asked for similar levels of allocations. Congress has approved each of these 
requests annually. As a result, between 2006 and 2011, the United States has provided 
Lebanon with more than $1.35 billion in financial aid to support programs meant to 
strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF), and 
build Lebanon’s democratic and civil society institutions.103 Examples of these programs 
include training both the LAF and the ISF,104 supplying both with equipment and material 
support, funding programs to reduce sectarianism in the LAF, and providing assistance to 
grow and develop the Lebanese economy, particularly in agricultural areas.105 Both the 
State Department and the Defense Department administer these funds.106 
Despite the current fiscal concerns of the U.S. government, it is unlikely that 
future aid to Lebanon will cease.107 Plans for the 2012 fiscal year include provisions to 
improve agribusiness, tourism, and entrepreneurial endeavors. The Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2012 allowed for similar levels of funding, yet noted that the 
United States was banned from giving aid to any government that included Hizbullah. 
                                                
103 Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, 
R41446 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2011), 1. 
104 The LAF is primarily responsible for military and border issues, while the ISF is primarily responsible 
for internal security needs. However, the responsibilities for the two sometimes overlap. 
105 See, for example:  Casey L. Addis, U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon, R40485 (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, January 19, 2011). 
106 Since 2006, the following initiatives have received funding to implement programs in Lebanon: 
Economic Support Fund (ESF, State Department); Foreign Military Financing (FMF, State Department); 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Assistance (INCLE, State Department); International 
Military and Education Training (IMET, State Department); Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, 
and Related Programs (NADR, State Department); Global Train and Equip Program (through Section 1206 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2006, Department of Defense); and Security and 
Stabilization Assistance program (through Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
2007, Department of Defense). For more information, see: Rebecca A. Hopkins, Lebanon and the Uprising 
in Syria: Issues for Congress, R42339 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 2, 
2012), 14. 
107 However, it should be noted that aid has decreased. In 2009, $299.32 million was allocated for U.S. 
security assistance to Lebanon. That number decreased to $187.38 million in 2011. The FY2012 request is 
$232.30 million. Hopkins, 14. 
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Presently, because neither the commander of the LAF nor the Defense Minister is a 
Hizbullah member, funding may continue. 108 
While these programs have realized measured success, they have largely failed to 
marginalize Hizbullah’s influence and authority. One analyst notes that, “while the U.S. 
government has taken measures to support the Lebanese state, it has not simultaneously 
taken direct action to limit the influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon and in the region, to 
stop the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, or to disarm its military wing.”109  
Some reasons for the limited success of U.S. policy initiatives include: 
Hizbullah’s continued role in the Lebanese government; U.S. refusal to separately 
recognize that Hizbullah’s political and military components; and the legitimacy that 
Hizbullah maintains within Lebanon. Drawing on Nasrallah’s rhetoric from the 2006 war, 
it is likely that Nasrallah’s use of rhetoric to brand and market Hizbullah limits the 
success of these U.S.-sponsored programs. For example, the way in which Nasrallah 
parlays Hizbullah’s abilities, as well as his anti-U.S. rhetoric, likely engenders and 
reinforces suspicions about U.S. objectives in Lebanon. His own legitimacy and 
credibility lend further credence to these thoughts. The U.S. is losing the war of ideas in 
Lebanon, in part because of Nasrallah’s rhetoric and authority.  
In addition, the reality of Hizbullah’s strength simultaneously limits the success of 
U.S. initiatives and reinforces Nasrallah’s rhetoric. Hizbullah is better armed and 
organized than both the LAF and the ISF; the group’s strategic and tactical maneuvers 
during the 2006 war indicated the group’s military sophistication. Additionally, Hizbullah 
counts some LAF and ISF officers as supporters, effectively limiting the influence of the 
American-supported programs. In short, Hizbullah may be more effective than each 
organization. Thus, while the additional funding may help improve some aspects of 
                                                
108 Hopkins, 16. 
109 Addis and Blanchard, 3. 
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Lebanese society, it is unlikely to combat the credibility that Hizbullah has built among 
its audiences, particularly in the short term.  
Yet Nasrallah’s rhetoric indicates the areas of interest and priority within 
Lebanese society. While the United States is unlikely to be able to counter the “divine 
inspiration” narrative, it has the ability to strategically target Nasrallah’s remaining four 
priorities and challenge his claims to legitimacy. 
U.S. emphasis on the helping the LAF and the ISF is predicated on strengthening 
the two forces and providing a counterweight to Hizbullah’s military sophistication. It is 
unlikely that the United States will be able to detract significantly from Hizbullah’s 
military capabilities. However, it can refocus its priorities vis-à-vis the LAF and the ISF 
and provide greater and more in-depth training. Additionally, the United States should 
consider funding initiatives that could provide social services and challenge Hizbullah’s 
extensive network. 
Present geopolitical trends have, in some ways, made Nasrallah’s rhetoric self-
limiting. Nasrallah’s continued support for Asad in the face of the Syrian uprising 
discredits Nasrallah’s “us versus them” narrative, weakens the claim that Hizbullah is the 
preeminent defender of Lebanon, and detracts from the importance placed on solidarity. 
While regime change in Syria will likely shift Hizbullah’s priorities and identity, the 
United States could use its public diplomacy initiatives and support for the March 14 
coalition to further exploit Nasrallah’s weaknesses in these areas. 
CONCLUSION 
By better understanding the way in which Nasrallah communicates to his 
audiences and legitimizes himself, both researchers and policy makers may get a better 
sense of the way in which Hizbullah operates and sustains itself. Nasrallah’s speech 
patterns provide insight into his leadership style, the targeted messaging that he uses, and 
the ways in which he prioritizes and presents Hizbullah’s current and future goals. One of 
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the present weaknesses of the policy community is the poor comprehension of Hizbullah 
as an organization; Israel’s conduct in the 2006 war evidences the grave repercussions 
that resulted from this lack of understanding. Although current regional politics, and 
particularly the uprising in Syria, have complicated Hizbullah’s status in the Middle East, 
the group will likely influence both Lebanese and regional politics for the foreseeable 
future. Nasrallah will continue to be a key player. Thus, more attention and better 
analysis of Hizbullah and its leadership is integral if the United Stats is going to develop 
smart and well-founded policies towards the Middle East. Placing an emphasis on 
understanding communications, messaging, and rhetoric can only improve this analysis. 
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